Perspectives on America's Decline, Part 1

Have the days of US global domination come to an end? Conventional wisdom seems to believe that it has. A recent Rasmussen poll showed only 32% of Americans believe America's best days are yet to come. 62% say today's children will not be better off than their parents, up 15% since the beginning of 2009.

As a student of history, I've decided to look at historical theories on the causes of an empire's decline and assess the degree to which these theories apply to the present day US. Today, I will consider the theory of tolerance put forth by Yale Law School professor Amy Chua in her 2007 book Day of Empire.

Chua argues one of the driving forces behind the rise and fall of a hyperpower--a global, unchallenged hegemon--is tolerance of people. Chua argues that religious, ethnic, and racial tolerance (relative to other nations) is indispensable to becoming a hyperpower. Furthermore, a hegemon's power will decrease as its tolerance decreases.

The British Empire

Chua traces the root of the British Empire back to 1689, when a new tolerance for Jews, Huguenots, and Scots brought new skills that built the foundation of Empire. In 1689, France rather than England was the most likely successor to the Netherlands as Europe's greatest power. France had a much bigger population, a stronger economy, and a bigger military, but England eventually triumphed because of its human capital.

Click to Read More >>

Russia's Soft Power and Opel

Russia seems to have increased its use of soft power to influence former Soviet states to cozy back up to Russia. One example is an address to the people of Ukraine posted on Medvedev's blog. This address laments the current relations between Kiev and Moscow and emphasizes their common cultural heritage. Another possible example of Russian soft power in Ukraine was Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill's visit to Ukraine a few weeks ago. Both of these actions stressed a common culture and a new beginning. They are directed at Ukraine's coming elections, where pro-Western leader Viktor Yushchenko is likely to lose. Another example is Putin's recent letter to the Polish public denouncing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that divided Poland between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

Russia's reconciliation tour is similar to Obama's at the start of his presidency. Both countries are using public diplomacy to better relations between their states. It will be interesting to see the reaction of Ukraine and Poland. My expectation is that it will have little to do with anything Medvedev or Putin says, but a lot to do with Obama's upcoming decision on the anti-ballistic missile defense system in Poland. Especially now that Germany and Russia have established better relations, it will be more difficult for Poland to resist Russian influence. I'm wondering whether this new attitude towards Russia in easter Europe is a sustainable trend or simply due to the fact that America is preoccupied in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another factor with surprising influence in Russo-German relations is the Opel deal. The question of to whom to sell Opel to has turned into a geopolitical standoff between Russia and the US. The issue is further complicated by private equity group RHJI continually improving its bid. It is now clear that RHJI is financially the better option for the German Government as it leaves it with much less debt to guarantee, a potential issue in the upcoming German elections only 4 weeks away. However, Russia is sure to be irritated if the Magna bid is not accepted. A recent, must-read Der Spiegel article describes how after a conversation with Obama on the subject, Merkel remarked the trans-Atlantic relationship was being "put to the test." A quote from the article:

What was probably the biggest miscalculation on the part of the German government was its underestimation of the importance of the Russian factor in American thinking. April 28, the date on which Russian carmaker Gaz announced its interest in Opel together with Magna, was for many in Washington and Detroit the day on which that consortium lost its appeal. Russian involvement is no small matter for Americans. GM is one of the biggest suppliers of foreign cars on the Russian market and wants to continue to maintain that position. At the same time, being forced to sell off part of GM "to the Russians" is something that would be seen by many Americans as a humiliating experience, even 20 years after the end of the Cold War.

The problem for Merkel is that she has no control over the decision. She has promised Medvedev she will support the Magna plan, who suggested a major Russian shipping deal in return. Geopolitically, this cannot end well for Merkel, though I think she is probably more worried about the effect on the upcoming elections.

The Israeli-Arab Stalemate

It seems anti-American sentiment in the Middle East has been gradually diminishing since Barack Obama was inaugurated. Syria has taken steps to weaken its ties with Iran in favor of more cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the US. Hezbollah suffered a surprising defeat in the recent Lebanese elections. Even Iran has exposed its less radical side. Consider the following data from a Gallup poll:

In face of these developments, it seems strange that Israel would move in the opposite direction, antagonizing its Arab neighbors by authorizing a further expansion of settlements. The settlement issue is of crucial importance to Arab leaders because it represents the Arab's greatest concern regarding Israel. Perhaps the greatest spark for Israeli-Palestine tension is Israeli demographic trends. Arabs generally don't have a problem with Jews in the Levant. They have a problem with a rapidly increasing Jewish population. In fact, great demographic expansion correlate to more violence between Jews and Arabs. Saudi Arabia, the most important Arab voice on this issue, has stated if there is a settlement freeze, "we will be ready to talk to the Americans about taking this forward."

Obama finds himself in a difficult position. The US has stated Israel must halt expansion of settlements, yet expansions continue. At the same time, Arabs will not negotiate until these expansions halt. This stalemate is likely to continue until an external shock changes the geopolitical balance between these nations. A change in the position of the US is unlikely, as that is completely unacceptable to Arab states and because US public opinion is not as pro-Israel as it used to be.

The stalemate is likely to continue for the following reasons. Israel cannot discontinue settlements for domestic political reasons. Israel has a strong conservative movement that will not allow compromise, unless they get something substantial in return, such as state recognition or a peace plan. On the other hand, the Arabs will not compromise until they get a significant concession first. The Arabs were badly burned during the last peace process, and are more skeptical this time around, the reason why they are insisting on a freeze to settlements before negotiating. As the FT points out here, Israel reaped a large peace dividend during the last major peace process without actually concluding a peace. During this time, from 1992 to 1996, diplomatic recognition of Israel went from 85 countries to 161 and the number of settlers increased by 50%. Also during this time, almost a million Jews from the former Soviet Union emigrated to Israel. Saudi Arabia was also burned in 2002, when it painstakingly had its Arab-Israeli peace plan endorsed by the Arab League (which cost Saudi Arabia a lot of soft power on the Arab street), only to have Israel reject it.

In conclusion, while Obama's soft power efforts in the Middle East have made a difference, there is little chance any progress will be made towards Arab-Israeli peace. The stalemate between Israel and Saudi Arabia will most likely be broken by an exogenous shock. One possibility is another attack from Hezbollah. Hezbollah has been steadily increasing its military position along the Lebanon-Israeli border. Israel could opt to attack Hezbollah to get to Iran, Hezbollah's backer, as Israel's options to stop an Iranian bomb are diminishing.

Bevin's Dilemma and Obama's Soft Power

If Zionists had a list of the most evil people in history, the British Foreign Secretary after WWII, Ernest Bevin, would be close to the top of the list, right under Hitler. The reason for this is that Bevin oppossed Jewish emigration to Palestine after WWII. Furthermore, he opposed the creation of a Jewish state. One has to agree denying Jews a home after the Holocaust isn't a praiseworthy act.

But, there is a different perspective. Bevin and the (flailing) British Empire had a strong interest in keeping Palestine peaceful. The Middle East was seen as the new future for the Empire, especially with mounting nationalism in India. Not only did Palestine have a crucial geopolitical position right by the Suez Canal, but relations with Arabs were key to maintaining British power over Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, and Aden (Yemen). Keeping even levels of population was a necessity for stability in Palestine, much like it is in Lebanon today. In general, when one looks back on the Arab-Israeli conflict, much of it stems from population differences. For example, in the 80s there was relative peace in Israel. Peace lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union brought a huge wave of Jewish immigrants to the region.

When one considers the enormous pressure on Bevin to maintain a crumbling empire and the negative implications of Jewish immigration for British interests, Bevin's position becomes more understandable. We can at least empathize that Bevin was in a very difficult position.Bevin's side of the story has been forgotten for too long. But, it seems Obama understands Bevin's dilemma. In fact, Obama might have found the perfect middle way between supporting Israel and pleasing the Arabs. Geopolitically, Obama's position is similar to Bevin's. Obama faces significant pressure to cede to Israel's demands; though like Bevin, giving in to these demands would mean a weaker position among Arabs. Also, much like Bevin, Obama has a much greater stake in being friends with the Middle East than previous presidents—a result of high oil prices and terrorism.

Giddeon Rachman wrote in the FT today that Obama is "a soft power president. But the world keeps asking him hard power questions." That may be true for cases like Afghanistan and North Korea, but the Israeli-Palestine conflict is a pure soft power play. I wrote in an earlier post that Obama's soft power efforts would yet bear dividends and I think that moment is near in the Middle East. With his highly anticipated speech in Cairo tomorrow (as well as his order to Netranyahu to stop settlements), Obama will set the course to achieve what Bevin could not: a balance of Arab pride and Israeli ambitions. Historians' most potent criticism of Bevin is not that he was anti-semetic, just very undiplomatic—what a difference soft power makes.

Obama, NATO, and Soft Power

This summer while living in Berlin, I watched Barack Obama give his historic speech at the Siegessäule in the Tiergarten. Apart from getting a nasty sting from a bee outside the Chancellor’s apartment, it was a great experience especially after being scorned by Germans for the last eight years for being an American. My close relatives would disparage American “imperialism,” even though it was often clear they did not fully understand the situation. For this reason I was surprised that the crowd’s cheers didn’t die down when Sen. Obama called for increased European involvement in Afghanistan.

It is almost a year later and Obama has reiterated his call for increased European support in Afghanistan, but this time as President. Even though Germany and Europe as a whole hold Obama in high regard, their commitment of 5,000 extra troops and trainers is nothing in comparison to the US’ 21,000. In a press conference after the summit, Obama expressed satisfaction with the number, calling it a “down payment.” However, Politico reported the outcome represented a limit on Obama’s diplomacy. The article argues European adulation of Obama does not translate into new policies.

I do not agree with Politico’s conclusion. Obama might yet see dividends from his diplomatic efforts. In fact, I would be very surprised if he doesn’t. The main barrier for European support in Afghanistan is domestic political sentiments. Before the election in an interview with Bill O’Reilly, Obama said the reason Europeans won’t fight is because of a strong anti-Iraq attitude in Europe. When O’Reilly sarcastically asked if Obama was going to change this with his “magic wand,” Obama replied he would engage in “deliberate diplomacy” and change policy in Iraq. So far he has stuck to his word. He has shifted troops from Iraq to Afghanistan and stuck to his diplomatic attitude.

There is a distinct difference between US diplomacy with the EU and countries like Russia and China. The EU seem much more genuine. Their policy positions are based on domestic situations within their countries, while Russia and China use diplomacy more as a game to further their interests. During the G20, the European position against a coordinated stimulus was based on the economic situation within their borders. Their demographic situation means large government debt is particularly precarious—that is not diplomacy that is a reality. During the NATO summit, European leaders do not have the political capital to send troops to Afghanistan. European public opinion needs more time before it will accept this. Sarkozy already took a big step rejoining NATO. Merkel needs to wait for this year’s elections before attempting any such move, especially while her CDU is gradually losing votes to the FDP. Maybe that is what Obama meant when he called NATO’s decision a “down payment.”

Now compare that to Russia and China. A few days before G20, Medvedev and Hu met to discuss an alternative global reserve currency. STRATFOR considers much of Russia’s actions, such as their response to the US’ planned ABM system in Poland, to be diplomatic huff intended to draw concessions. About China and its recent calls for a new global reserve currency, STRATFOR writes, “None of this amounts to anything substantial, and China knows it — the purpose is to put the United States in a defensive position ahead of the summit, thus pre-empting potential criticism aimed at China from any direction. In truth, China wants to protect the value of the dollar to maintain the worth of its own dollar-denominated investments. Deep down, China sees the U.S.-centered global system as essential, and does not wish to stir up bad feelings with the United States, which would only postpone global economic recovery.” The Europeans might be stubborn, but at least they are honest.

At first I was hoping Obama would resurrect the United States Information Agency as McCain had pledged during the campaign. I no longer think this is necessary. Obama does a good enough job interacting with foreign media that there is no need for it. Consider his interview with Al-Arabiya, his town hall meeting in Strasbourg, or even small gestures such as allowing foreign media to ask him questions during press conferences. Obama has embraced soft power and eventually this will protect him from more than shoes at an Iraqi press conference.